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Cooperation across multiple game 
theoretical paradigms is increased 
by fear more than anger in selfish 
individuals
G. Chierchia1*, F. H. Parianen Lesemann2, D. Snower3,4 & T. Singer5*
Cooperative decisions are well predicted by stable individual differences in social values but it remains 
unclear how they may be modulated by emotions such as fear and anger. Moving beyond specific 
decision paradigms, we used a suite of economic games and investigated how experimental inductions 
of fear or anger affect latent factors of decision making in individuals with selfish or prosocial value 
orientations. We found that, relative to experimentally induced anger, induced fear elicited higher 
scores on a cooperation factor, and that this effect was entirely driven by selfish participants. In 
fact, induced fear brought selfish individuals to cooperate similarly to prosocial individuals, possibly 
as a (selfish) mean to seek protection in others. These results suggest that two basic threat-related 
emotions, fear and anger, differentially affect a generalized form of cooperation and that this effect is 
buffered by prosocial value orientation.
Humans across cultures are known to frequently incur costs to benefit or punish  others1. To account for this, 
 psychologists2,3 have demonstrated that stable inter-individual differences in social value orientation (such as 
prosocial vs. individualistic value orientation) can influence such social decisions across time and  contexts4,5. 
Similarly, economists have developed theories of social preferences, conceived as stable inter-individual differ-
ences in preferences for certain type of  goals6–8. Much harder to reconcile with economic theory are ‘incidental’ 
or induced emotions and motives, which have been shown to affect decisions even if they are unrelated to 
 them9–11. Here, we ask how individual differences in social value orientation modulate decisions to cooperate 
and punish when individuals feel threatened. We address this by assessing how experimental inductions of fear 
(threat-avoidance motives) and anger (threat-approach motives) affect these decisions in individuals with dif-
fering social value orientation.
A long-standing view contends that fear and anger arise from a common underlying threat  system12, with fear 
promoting the avoidance of  threats13–15, and anger their  approach16,17. In line with this, both inter-individual dif-
ferences in disposition to experience fear and  anger18–20, as well as experimental inductions of fear and  anger21–26, 
have been shown to oppositely affect judgment and decision making, with fear contributing to avoidance, and 
anger to approach of risk in non social decisions. However, it is unclear how this may extend to social decisions, 
such as those related to cooperation and  punishment27.
In particular, while induced anger has been associated with decreased  cooperation28–30 and increased 
 punishments31–35, it remains unclear how fear may be related to cooperative decisions. On the one hand, coop-
eration frequently involves real or perceived “risks”, such as the risk of being socially excluded or the risk that one’s 
cooperation will not reciprocated. In this case, induced fear could lead individuals away from cooperation. On 
the other hand, fear has also been linked with a motive to seek protection and  safety13,15,36,37, potentially leading 
subjects to engage in cooperative behaviors as a mean to seek protection in  others38. Problematically, the empirical 
literature remains mixed in this regard, as manipulations of fear, or fear-associated stress, have been associated 
with both increased cooperative  behaviors39–44 and decreased cooperative  behaviors45–47.
One possible source for the inconsistency of these results could be that these studies focused on different 
decision paradigms, which varied in important characteristics. For instance, some studies focused on coopera-
tive decisions that involved uncertainty of reciprocation (e.g., trusting others)39,45,47, while other studies did 
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not (e.g., when deciding to give to others with no possibility of reciprocation)40–42,45,46,48. As briefly described 
above, even in non social decision making, induced fear can lead to aversion to risk and  uncertainty18 and it is 
therefore unsurprising that this may carry over to social decisions in which uncertainty is  salient47. The deci-
sion paradigms employed in previous studies also varied in other potentially important aspects: from specific 
payoff  parameters49, to nuances of the  instructions50, “details” that are now known to affect  decisions51,52, and 
that could plausibly interact with the effects of induced emotions. These and many other differences make it 
difficult to compare existing results, and plausibly also reflect the more general problem that decision scenarios 
vary between laboratories, let alone in the  field53.
One standard way to address this problem would be to “zoom into” each decision paradigm and systemati-
cally investigate the impact of induced emotions in each of its variants. However, this approach would be rather 
impractical as, for example, it would require a large amount of experiments and many corrections for multiple 
comparisons. Here, we take a more recent and contrasting approach that involves “zooming out” of specific deci-
sion paradigms, by focusing on sources of variance in cooperation and punishment that are common to many of 
them. In particular, recent studies have used factor analysis to individuate latent constructs of cooperation and 
 punishment54–56. These and other studies suggest that despite critical differences between decision paradigms, 
subjects who tend to cooperate more in one decision paradigm, also tend to do so in others: from cooperation in 
social dilemmas (such as prisoner’s dilemmas) to unreciprocated giving (e.g., dictator games)57, to decisions to 
trust others, donating to charities, reciprocating kind gestures with kindness etc. Cooperative behavior has also 
been suggested to remain stable in  time4, and to extend outside of laboratory  settings55, leading some authors to 
speak of a “domain general […] cooperative phenotype”55 (p. 1), which has recently been extended to a “moral 
phenotype”58. Here, we thus aimed to investigate whether induced fear and anger may have such a generalized 
impact on decisions.
Finally, in addition to variation in decision paradigms, we aimed to control for variation between individu-
als. In particular, theories on attitude-behavior links suggest that strong attitudes towards a given behavior can 
make that behavior more stable in time, more resistant to change and more context  independent59,60 and some 
findings indeed suggest that context effects on cooperation are greater in individuals with weak cooperative value 
 orientations61,62. Moreover, with regards specifically to fear, other  studies44,48 found that fear-related inductions 
tend to increase cooperative behaviors only in subjects with weak pre-existing attitudes towards those behav-
iors. Based on this, we hypothesized that strong prosocial value orientations could potentially buffer the influ-
ence of induced fear and anger on decisions. To measure such values we used the social value orientation task 
(henceforth, “SVO”)2, because in addition to being a well-known predictor of behavior in economic  games5,63, 
it has also been shown to predict cooperative behavior across  domains4, from  volunteering64, to  donating65, to 
engaging in pro-environmental  efforts66.
In synthesis, while induced anger has been related to decreased cooperation and increased punishment, 
understanding how induced fear contributes to these behaviors has remained a contended issue, both theoreti-
cally and empirically. To assess generalizable results across decision paradigms and individuals, we aimed to 
compare the impact of induced fear and anger on latent factors of cooperation and punishment using a suite of 
game-theoretical paradigms and we proposed that the impact of such emotions should be primarily be observed 
in subjects that do not have already have strong cooperative value orientations to counteract them. These subjects 
could provide a good test-bed to clarify whether induced fear is more likely to increase or decrease cooperative 
behaviors.
Results
Induction validation. To induce fear, one group of participants took part in an anticipatory version of the 
Trier Social Stress  Task45, involving a simulated job interview. Another group of participants took part in an 
Anger induction (inductions will henceforth be capitalized to distinguish these from other occurrences of the 
emotion terms), in which they received negative and unfair feedback on a short essay they  wrote67. In a Control 
induction, a third group of participants were requested to read a passage of text. These inductions were matched 
in terms of duration and sequence of events (Fig. 1A) (see “Inductions” in the Methods section for details). To 
validate these inductions, before and after being introduced to their respective activities, participants rated how 
well a number of words described their current mood, emotions and motives (see “Induction validation” in 
the Methods section for details). Inter-mixed amongst a number of control emotions and motives were words 
related to fear and anger. Changes in ratings were used as dependent variables to validate the inductions.
A linear mixed effect model on change scores (i.e., difference between post-induction and pre-induction rat-
ings) revealed a significant interaction between the induction and the motive/affective state  (F(16,1376) = 15.007, 
p < 0.001), suggesting that the latter were differentially affected by the inductions (Fig. 1B). Contrasts within 
the model suggested that the Fear and Anger inductions succeeded in differentially eliciting the target motives: 
increases in anger were higher in the Anger induction than in the Fear induction (“Anger–Fear”: b = 91.192, 95% 
CI [30.768 96.324], p < 0.001) and in Control induction (“Anger–Control”: b = 91.192, 95% CI [59.338 123.047], 
p < 0.001); while increases in fear were higher in the Fear induction than in the Anger induction (“Anger–Fear”: 
b = − 39.222, 95% CI [− 74.998 − 9.442], p = 0.048) and in the Control induction (“Control–Fear”: b = − 91.976, 
95% CI [− 123.831 − 60.122], p < 0.001) (p-values are Bonferroni-corrected for four tests). Exploratory contrasts 
on the other questionnaire items further showed that induced Fear and Anger did not elicit differential effects on 
other control motives, which included Power, Care, Affiliation, Achievement and an exploratory Consumption 
motive  (ps > 0.192, see Supplementary Material, Supplementary Table ST3 for all contrasts). However, relative 
to the Fear induction, the Anger induction resulted in increased sadness (“Anger–Fear”: b = 74.205, 95% CI 
[41.427 106.983], p < 0.001) and decreased happiness (“Anger–Fear”: b = − 53.007, 95% CI [− 85.785 − 20.229], 
p = 0.046). To investigate this further, we asked whether changes in anger and fear could be explained by changes 
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in happiness and sadness. To do so, we used the anger and fear change scores as dependent variables, and ran 
two linear regression models on each. As independent variable, we used the induction factor and the changes in 
happiness or sadness ratings. These models suggested that, even though happiness and sadness significantly con-
tributed to the increases in anger and fear (all  ps < 0.001, except for the impact of happiness on anger: p = 0.084), 
the inductions continued to reliably predict changes in the target motives (all  ps < 0.001), even controlling for 
the non-target changes in happiness and sadness. This suggests that changes in fear and anger were far from fully 
explained by changes in happiness and sadness. Nonetheless, in addition to these control models, we further 
controlled for these unanticipated effects of our inductions by adding happiness and sadness change scores as 
covariates when modeling the economic decisions (see “Model 2” in the Supplementary Material, Supplementary 
Tables ST4 and ST5).
Two factors of economic behavior. While participants waited for the induction activities to take place, 
they took part in an allegedly separate study on economic decision making, involving real monetary incentives, 
and consisting in a suite of game theoretic paradigms (see “Game theoretic paradigms” in the Methods section 
for details). In contrast, social value orientation measures (SVO) were requested from participants 2 weeks after 
the inductions to avoid any spill-over effects between the two (see “Social value orientation” in the Methods 
section for details). Finally, an ‘experimental demand’ questionnaire was conducted after the game theoretic 
paradigms to probe participants’ awareness of any relation between these and the inductions (see Supplementary 
Material SM1, “Experimental demand questionnaire”).
A Spearman’s correlation matrix (Fig. 2) suggested that two groups of economic behaviors were inter-corre-
lated. Specifically, 1st and 2nd movers in the trust game—represented by average (1st mover) transfer rates (i.e., 
“trust” by 1st movers) and average returns (i.e., “trustworthiness” by 2nd movers), average charitable donations, 
transfers in the dictator game, proposals as 1st movers in the ultimatum game, contributions to public goods, 
restraint in common resource dilemmas and helping in the Zurich prosocial game, all positively correlated. On 
the other hand, average punishment rates in the 2nd and 3rd party punishment games, and frequency of rejec-
tions in the ultimatum and impunity games, all positively correlated with one another.
To formally test these groupings in a factor analysis, we first obtained a number of indexes indicating how 
many components to retain (see “Statistical analyses” in the Methods section for details). All tested indexes 
(parallel analysis, optimal coordinates, acceleration factor, very simple structure and Velicer’s MAP criterion) 
recommended retaining 2 factors. Moreover, since oblique (i.e., oblimin) rotation revealed only a very weak 
Figure 1.  Panel (A) Experimental design. Panel (B) Induction validation. Planned contrasts showed that 
increases in anger ratings were higher in the Anger induction than in the Fear induction. Vice versa, increases in 
fear were higher in the Fear induction that in the Anger induction. Exploratory contrasts revealed that induced 
Fear and Anger also differentially elicited happiness and sadness. Ratings were provided on visual analogue 
scales ranging from − 350 to 350. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, Bonferroni corrected.
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(anti-) correlation between the two factors (r = − 0.1), we retained Varimax  rotation68. The resulting orthogonal 
2-factor solution had a satisfactory fit (RMSEA = 0.064, TLI = 0.852) and confirmatory factor analysis suggested 
it was stable across the inductions: nor the loadings nor the intercepts differed between the inductions (respec-
tively p = 0.122 and p = 0.659). It also explained nearly one third (31%) of the variance of 12 economic variables 
with only two factors.
This two factor solution largely corroborated the groupings of economic variables informally suggested by 
the correlation matrix (Table 1 and Fig. 3): amounts entrusted and returned (i.e., “trustworthiness”), charitable 
donations, offer sizes in the ultimatum game, transfer size in the dictator game, contributions to public goods, 
restraint in common resource dilemmas and helping in the Zurich prosocial game, all loaded on the first factor 
(all loadings > 0.35). Following previous  studies55,56, we labeled this a “Cooperation factor”. On the other hand, 
amounts spent to punish others in 2nd and 3rd party punishment games, frequency of rejections in ultimatum 
and impunity games loaded on the second factor (all loadings > 0.45). Since the top loading variables on this 
factor were the 2nd and 3rd party punishment games, we called this a “Punishment factor”. Most variables loaded 
uniquely on the respective factors (mean item complexity = 1.1). Only the rDOC and the DG had above higher 
complexity (1.5 and 1.3, respectively), loading negatively and positively on the punishment factor, respectively. 
Böckler et al.54 describe two similar factors as an “altruistically motivated prosocial behavior” factor and a “norm-
motivated prosocial behavior”, respectively.
The impact of induced fear and anger on latent constructs of cooperation and punish-
ment. The factor analysis additionally enabled to obtain one pair of scores for each participant. These can 
also be thought of as a pair of coordinates, determining participants’ position on a “cooperation x punishment 
space” (Fig.  3). These two scores were submitted to regression analyses. Our primary model of interest (see 
“Model 1” in “Statistical analyses”) on the cooperation scores revealed a highly significant impact of SVO on 
cooperation  (F(1,149) = 20.222, p < 0.001), a significant main effect of the inductions  (F(2,149) = 3.785, p = 0.0.025), 
and a significant interaction between SVO and the inductions  (F(2,149) = 5.482, p = 0.005) (the model estimates are 
plotted in Fig. 4). Addressing the main effects, contrasts within the model suggested that prosocial participants 
cooperated more than selfish participants (“Proself–Prosocial”: b = − 0.601, 95% CI [− 0.866 − 0.337], p < 0.001). 
As for the inductions, cooperation was higher under induced Fear relative to induced Anger (“Anger–Fear”: 
b = − 0.446, 95% CI [− 0.847 − 0.045], p = 0.024), while neither of the latter differed from Control (“Control–
Fear”: b = −  0.307, 95% CI [−  0.703 0.089], p = 0.186; “Anger–Control”: b = −  0.138, 95% CI [−  0.531 0.254], 
p = 1.00). Finally, contrasts addressing the interaction suggested that the effect of the inductions was driven by 
Figure 2.  Spearman correlation matrix of behavior in game-theoretic paradigms. Colored cells represent 
significant correlations corrected with the Holm’s method. Numbers are correlation coefficients presented in 
percentages. Variables are ordered on the basis of the first principle component, triangles are manually super-
imposed to highlight two potential groups of decisions. PG (contributions in a public good game), TG1 and 
TG2 (amounts entrusted and returned as 1st and 2nd mover in a trust game, respectively), rDOC (restraint in a 
dilemma of the commons), CD (amounts donated to charities), ZPG (frequency of helping choices in the Zurich 
prosocial game), DG (transfers in a dictator game), UG1 (offer size in an ultimatum game), UG2 (frequency of 
rejections in an ultimatum game), IMP (frequency of rejections in an impunity game), 2PP and 3PP (amount 
spent to punish norm violators in 2nd and 3rd party punishment games).
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proself individuals: while the inductions did not significantly affect levels of cooperation in participants with 
prosocial orientations (all  ps > 0.423, uncorrected), Fear and Anger differentially affected cooperation in partici-
pants with selfish orientation. Specifically, in proself individuals, cooperation scores were higher under induced 
Fear than Anger (“Anger–Fear”: b = −  0.993, 95% CI [−  1.659 −  0.327], p = 0.001), and were non-dissociable 
between either of the latter and the Control induction (“Anger–Control”: b = − 0.440, 95% CI [− 1.051 0.171], 
p = 0.250; “Control–Fear”: b = − 0.553, 95% CI [− 1.175 0.070], p = 0.099). In line with this, proself participants 
cooperated less than prosocial participants in the Control induction condition (“Proself–Prosocial”: b = − 0.564, 
95% CI [− 1.010 − 0.117], p = 0.014) and in the Anger induction condition (“Proself–Prosocial”: b = − 1.168, 
95% CI [− 1.627 − 0.708], p < 0.001), but not in the Fear induction condition, where proselves cooperated to the 
same extent as prosocials (“Proself–Prosocial”: b = − 0.073, 95% CI [− 0.540 0.400], p = 0.758). This main finding, 
namely, that Fear and Anger differentially affect cooperation in selfish individuals, was robust to the inclusion 
of a number of potential confound variables (including gender, the interaction of gender with the inductions, 
risk attitudes and happiness and sadness change scores) (see “Model 2” in the Supplementary Material, Supple-
mentary Tables ST4 and ST5); it was also robust to the exclusion of outliers (e.g., by winsorizing the cooperation 
scores) and to the exclusion of participants that, when explicitly asked in the awareness questionnaire, expressed 
even irrelevant suspicion about possible connections between the inductions and the economic decisions (see 
Supplementary Material SM1 for details). Finally, these results held when modeling SVO as a continuous predic-
tor. In particular, a regression model revealed a significant impact of the inductions, of SVO (continuous), and 
of their interaction in predicting cooperative decisions (all  ps < 0.01, see Supplementary Table ST6 in the Sup-
plementary Material). The observed pattern of results was entirely consistent with those illustrated above (see 
Supplementary Fig. SF1 in the Supplementary Material).
In the same way, we investigated the impact of the inductions, SVO, and their interaction on punishment 
scores. However here, in contrast to our hypotheses, none of the factors had a significant impact on punishments 
(SVO:  F(1,149) = 0.343, p = 0.559; inductions:  F(2,149) = 0.294, p = 0.746; SVO × inductions:  F(2,149) = 2.095, p = 0.127). 
Table 1.  Factor analysis of 12 economic variables: 2-factor solution. Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) 
based upon correlation matrix, communality (“Com”) and complexity (“Comp”) of each variable. Two factors, 





Trust game (1st mover) 0.53 0.00 0.28 1.0
Trust game (2nd mover) 0.50 − 0.10 0.26 1.1
Charitable donations 0.47 − 0.02 0.22 1.0
Dictator game 0.45 0.19 0.24 1.3
Ultimatum game (1st mover) 0.36 0.09 0.14 1.1
Public good game 0.57 − 0.03 0.32 1.0
Dilemma of the commons 0.39 − 0.21 0.19 1.5
Zurich prosocial game 0.55 − 0.01 0.30 1.0
2nd party punishment 0.01 0.74 0.55 1.0
3rd party punishment − 0.01 0.80 0.64 1.0
Ultimatum game (2nd mover) 0.01 0.55 0.30 1.0
Impunity game − 0.02 0.46 0.21 1.0
Proportion variance explained 0.16 0.15
Figure 3.  Factor analysis bi-plot. 2 factors, labeled “Cooperation” and a “Punishment”, explain nearly one third 
(31%) of the variance from 12 different decision environments.
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Exploratory contrasts also suggested that the inductions had no significant impact on punishing, neither in self-
ish nor in prosocial participants (all contrasts  ps > 0.142). For comparability with the cooperation model we plot 
the estimated fixed effects for both social value types in the right panel of Fig. 4. These null-findings were also 
confirmed by a second linear model incorporating the additional predictors described above (SVO:  F(1,149) = 0.124, 
0.726; inductions:  F(2,149) = 0.531, p = 0.589; SVO × inductions:  F(2,149) = 2.162, p = 0.119).
Discussion
Human cooperative behaviors are modulated by stable inter-individual differences in prosocial or selfish value 
orientations, yet it remains unclear how these stable values interact with induced or incidental perceptions of 
threat. To address this, we experimentally induced either anger or fear in individuals with different social value 
orientations and had them take part in a suite of incentivized decision paradigms that fall along one of two 
latent factors: cooperative and punishment based  decisions4,27,54–56. Our results show that induced Fear increases 
scores on a latent cooperation factor, relative to induced Anger. We also find that this effect is entirely driven 
by individuals with “selfish” social value orientations. These results extend previous findings in several ways.
In non social decisions, induced fear and anger have been respectively associated with avoidance and approach 
of  risk18,19,21–26. Our results extend this by showing that, in the context of social decision making related to coop-
eration, induced fear is more likely to increase cooperation, relative to induced anger. In addition, given that fear 
and anger both involve negative valence and high arousal, our findings suggest that the impact of these induced 
emotions on decision making are unlikely to be entirely explained by mood or arousal  alone19, nor by “mood 
reparation”48. Rather we suggest that these findings are consistent with motive-based approaches to fear and 
anger, which link fear and anger to particular motives, such as a defensive or aggressive motives,  respectively15,69. 
Under this view, when social contexts are involved, induced fear may lead to social approach oriented behaviors as 
a protection mechanism, to seek support and acquaintance in the face of  danger38; while anger can lead subjects 
to avoid cooperative gestures, as a means to antagonize  others28.
The fact that this differential effect of induced Fear and Anger is only observed in selfish individuals aligns 
with the notion that strong cooperative values can buffer the impact of certain motives and  emotions59: while 
selfish individuals could behave cooperatively especially when it suits their need for self-protection44,48, such a 
self-serving motive is incoherent with prosocial value orientations. This is also in line with evidence suggesting 
that fear-induced cooperation is unlikely to stem from genuine care for others. For instance, perceived threats 
have been shown to increase cooperation with one’s peers or  ingroup70,71 and stress has been shown to increase 
Figure 4.  Top: latent measures of cooperation (left) and punishment (right) as a function of induced Fear 
or Anger, relative to participants in a Control induction. Error bars represent 95th confidence intervals. 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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cooperation only towards closer  others42. This instrumental perspective of the “tend and befriend”  hypothesis38 
offers a plausible explanation of why this cooperative response to fear is only observed in selfish individuals.
Surprisingly, we do not observe a main effect of induced anger on decisions to punish, which has instead been 
observed in previous  studies31–34. With hindsight, we speculate that this can be due to an incorrect selection of a 
moderating individual difference variable for the punishment domain. In fact, while there was a clear candidate 
for the value orientation that would predict cooperative behavior, the same was not true for punishing behaviors. 
Future studies might address whether “social dominance orientation”72, or a moderating variable that has been 
shown to predict punishments in game theoretical paradigms (such as the ‘assertiveness scale’73), may be able to 
better detect the interaction of values and incidental emotions on punishments.
Finally, by taking a factor analytic approach our study is the first to our knowledge to document a link between 
induced motivational states, social values, and a “domain general” cooperation  factor55. This approach does not 
intend to deny important differences between individual decision paradigms, some of which might very well 
influence how specific decisions are affected by motives and emotions. Rather, we suggest that this approach 
could provide a relatively unbiased illustration of the effects of induced Fear and Anger on cooperative decision 
making, by describing how these threat-related emotions affect a source of behavioral variance that is common 
to many if not all of  them4,54–56. This factor analytic approach might thus alleviate problems related the reliability 
and ecological validity of game-theoretical  paradigms53. Ultimately, it may also contribute to the ongoing integra-
tion of economics and  psychology9,74,75, by helping economists formalize the impact of emotions and motives 
on economic decision  making76.
Conclusions
Plausibly, no psychologist would endorse one of the basic assumptions of neoclassic economic theory: that 
decisions are driven only by stable context-insensitive  preferences9,77. However, to integrate psychological and 
economic frameworks, psychologists should provide empirical evidence as to how important motives and emo-
tions such as fear and anger systematically affect economic decision making. Our results suggest that in indi-
viduals with selfish value orientations induced Fear is more likely to increase cooperative behaviors, relative to 
induced Anger. The finding that selfish individuals drive this differential effect suggests that prosocial values 
can buffer the impact of certain emotions on cooperation: while selfish individuals may especially increase their 
cooperative behavior in the face of fear, such instrumental cooperation may conflict with the value orientations of 
prosocial individuals. Taken together, these findings shed light on the importance of both context-sensitivity and 
pre-existing differences in prosocial value orientations in determining cooperative behavior. Finally, by capital-
izing on a source of variance that is common to many decision contexts and on inter-individual differences, our 
results highlight how fear-inducing contexts (e.g., cultures or climates of fear) can influence a generalized form 
of cooperative behavior, and sheds light on which individuals might be more susceptible to this.
Methods
Participants. 175 participants (82 males, 93 females, mean age = 27.1, SD = 4.8) were assigned either to a 
“Fear” (N = 56, 25 males, 31 females, mean age = 26.5, SD = 4.4), an “Anger” (N = 56, 26 males, 30 females, mean 
age = 26.6, SD = 4.1) or a “Control” group (N = 63, 31 males, 32 females, mean age = 27.8, SD = 5.7). A sepa-
rate group of participants was assigned to two other motive-inductions not relevant to this study, which have 
been published elsewhere together with the same Control  group56. Participants were recruited through the Max 
Planck’s Institute participant database. All studies were advertised, via email, to all eligible participants in the 
database, namely, participants between the age of 18 and 65, with no history of cognitive, psychiatric or neu-
rological disorder. Participants registered to the studies on a first-come first-served basis. Age and gender were 
similarly distributed across each group (all pairwise comparisons,  ps > 0.1). Participants provided informed con-
sent for the treatment of their anonymized data and all methods were carried out in accordance with relevant 
guidelines and regulations. Assessments were approved by the Research Ethics Committee (Agreement Number 
090-15-09032015) of the University of Leipzig, Germany. Data will be made available upon reasonable request.
Inductions. Group sessions took place in a computer room with shielded computer cubicles. In all induc-
tions, participants first provided baseline ratings on a number of emotion and motive-related items (see “Induc-
tion validation”). Then, they were informed about one of three activities. Participants in the Fear group took 
part in the anticipatory Trier Social Stress Task (henceforth, “aTSST”)45,78, in which they were informed about 
a simulated job interview requiring them to take part in a series of (stressful) tasks in front of two anonymous 
interviewers. We chose the anticipatory variant of the TSST because while the standard TSST is known to elicit 
both fear and  anger79, the aTSST has been suggested to predominantly enhance anxiety rather than hostility and 
 aggression78. To induce Anger, we adapted the “negative feedback”  procedure67,80 in which participants receive 
negative (and unfair) feedback on a short personal essay they wrote and anticipated providing feedback to the 
reviewer’s essay in turn. In the Control condition, participants only anticipated reading a passage of a text. To 
increase the salience of these activities, participants were accompanied to a different room, one by one. Here, in 
the Fear induction, they found the two aforementioned interviewers (one male, one female), wearing lab-coats 
and sitting behind a desk. These interviewers asked participants a set of preliminary questions in a detached 
fashion (e.g., what job they would like to interview for, and why they thought they would be good candidates 
for that job). In the Anger induction, participants were shown a single-blind mirror, where they later would 
have the opportunity to provide feedback to their (unfair) reviewer, via microphone, on his/her essay. In the 
Control induction, subjects were shown the recording room where they later would be recorded whilst reading 
the text passage and gave a brief sound check. After returning to the computer room, subjects provided ratings 
on the same emotion and motive-related items rated previously. A different experimenter then told participants 
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that, while they waited for the activities to be prepared, they would take part in an allegedly different study on 
economic decision making (see “Game theoretic paradigms”, below). To maintain the inductions salient, half 
way through the decision making study, participants were asked to take notes for 5 min, to prepare for the activi-
ties. After completing the decision making study, participants took part in a written questionnaire probing for 
awareness of any connection between the two studies (see Supplementary Material SM1, “Experimental demand 
questionnaire”). Finally, participants were fully debriefed and paid for their participation and for one of their 
decisions. The whole experimental session was self-paced and lasted 1 h and 30 min on average.
Induction validation. Before and after being introduced to the induction-specific activities (see “Induc-
tions”), participants provided baseline (“pre-induction”) and test (“post-induction”) ratings indicating how well 
a list of fear and anger-related words described their motivation or feelings (with visual analogue scales ranging 
from − 350 to 350). The fear items were (here translated from German) “apprehensive”, “afraid”, “timid”, “nerv-
ous”, “panic-stricken”, “overcautious”, “frightened”, “reserved”, while the anger items were “aggressive”, “angry”, 
“offended”, “irritable”, “argumentative”, “tempestuous”, “spirited”. These items were chosen because they best-
discriminate the target constructs from related but distinct  constructs81. Previous work using emotional induc-
tions prevalently controlled for constructs of interest only, yet it appears plausible that, an Anger induction may 
concurrently increase feelings of power in some individuals, or that a Fear induction may also increase feelings 
of achievement, given that it involves a simulated job interview. To address this, in addition to the emotions of 
interest (i.e., fear and anger), the questionnaire also probed five motive-related measures: achievement, affilia-
tion, care, power and consumption; and two affect-related measures: happiness (i.e., positive affect) and sadness 
(negative affect) (see Supplementary Material SM2 for the list of all items). Overall, the questionnaire consisted 
of 63 items composing 9 measures (7-motive related and 2 affect related constructs). The order of all items was 
fully randomized for each participant, who rated 7 items per page. To analyze this data, we first subtracted the 
pre-induction ratings of each item from the corresponding post-induction ratings and then averaged over items 
pertaining to the same construct, thus yielding 9 “change scores”. Finally, to validate the inductions, we com-
pared these difference scores between the inductions (see “Statistical analyses”).
Game theoretic paradigms. To measure cooperation and punishment we had subjects take part in a 
suite of paradigms that have been found to factor together in previous  studies54–56. Specifically, as candidate 
contributors to a “cooperation factor”, we had participants take part in a dictator game (in which they decided 
how much money, if any, to transfer to a passive recipient), a trust game (in which, as 1st movers, participants 
decided how much to entrust to a second mover, and as 2nd movers decided how much to return to the 1st 
movers), a charitable donations game (in which participants decided how much to donate to various charities), a 
public good game (in which they decided how much money to contribute to a public good), a common resource 
dilemma (in which they decided how much to take from a common resource) and the “Zurich prosocial game” 
(in which participants decided how much to help their counterparts in a virtual maze). As for the punishment-
related games, we adopted the 2nd and 3rd party punishment game (in which participants observed how much 
another player transferred to themselves or a third party—2nd and 3rd mover variants, respectively—and, on 
the basis of this, decided how much money, if any, to invest to “punish” them, that is, to decrease their payoff), 
an ultimatum game (in which, as 1st movers, participants made a proposal on how to split a monetary prize to 
a responder, knowing that responders would then have two options: if they accepted the monetary prize was 
split as proposed, if they rejected, both players received nothing), and an impunity game (which is identical to 
the ultimatum game with the exception that, if second movers rejected an offer, first movers still retain what 
they proposed to keep for themselves). Following our previous  study56, we first obtained one measure for each 
paradigm (averaging over measures in the case of multiple trials). We then subjected the resulting 12 measures to 
factor analysis (see “Statistical analyses”). Finally, to control for the potential impact of our inductions on social 
decisions net of any effect they may have on non-social decisions, we measured risk attitudes by means of a lot-
tery task. This task was taken from Dawans and  colleagues39,45, and involved a series of binary decisions in which 
participants chose between two lotteries with similar expected value but different levels of risk. The frequency of 
choices of the riskier lottery was used as a measure of participants’ non-social risk attitudes. All economic games 
were divided in two blocks to avoid potential spill-over effects between superficially similar games (such as 2nd 
and 3rd party punishment, see Supplementary Material SM3 for full details on block composition). The order of 
games within a block was fully randomized and the order of blocks was counterbalanced between participants. 
Participants were informed that they would be paid for one randomly determined decision, at the end of the 
experiment. Full details on each of the decision paradigms are available in the Supplementary Material (Sup-
plementary Tables ST1 and ST2). Instructions are available upon request.
Social value orientation. To measure inter-individual differences in social values we used the social value 
orientation task (“SVO”)2,3. In order to reduce the possibility that the inductions could affect the SVO scores, 
these were measured on a different day. Specifically, two weeks after the participants came to the lab to take part 
in the economic decisions, they were sent an email linking them to the SVO questionnaire (to be done online). 
We used the SVO “slider measure”, as this has been suggested to be more reliable than previous  measures82 and 
we focused on the 6 primary items because the secondary items are mostly required to distinguish between finer 
types of prosocial orientation, which were outside of the scope of this study. Each of these six primary items 
require subjects to choose between nine different point allocations to themselves and anonymous others (e.g., 
between option A: {100 for self and 50 for other} vs. option B: {85 for self, 85 for others}, etc.). Following previous 
 research83, we divided participants into “proself ”, also called “selfish” participants (a classification which com-
bines subjects displaying individualists and competitive values), and “prosocial” participants (combining par-
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ticipants with prosocial and altruistic values). These aggregations are typically made because of the relatively low 
numbers of altruists and competitors that are  observed5. All participants had accepted to take part in this addi-
tional online component of the experiment but 20 participants (three in the Anger induction, three in the Fear 
induction, 14 in the Control induction) never got back to our invitation emails. Consequently, the SVO scores 
of these participants, but not their economic decisions, are missing. The SVO scores did not differ between any 
of the groups (all  ps > 0.17). In the Anger, Control, and Fear conditions, respectively, we identified n = 17, 23 and 
16 proself participants and n = 36, 26 and 37 prosocial participants. Finally, our results also held when modelling 
SVO as a continuous predictor (Supplementary Table ST6and Supplementary Fig. SF1)84.
Statistical analysis. For induction validation, we used a mixed effect model predicting change scores in 
self reported ratings based on the induction (with levels: “Fear”, “Anger”, “Control”) the motivational/affective 
state (9 levels) and their interaction. These factors were modeled as fixed effects, while participant IDs were used 
as random intercept terms, to account for the fact that observations were clustered at the subject level. Planned 
contrasts within this model focused on the emotions of interest, namely, whether changes in fear were higher in 
the Fear induction relative to the other inductions, and whether changes in anger differed between the Anger 
induction and the other inductions. Additional exploratory contrasts investigated the remaining 7 change scores.
To investigate our main question of interest (i.e., whether induced Fear and Anger differentially affect latent 
factors of social decision making), we first aimed to obtain a reliable factor scores for the 12 decision environ-
ments, following the methods used in our previous  work56. More specifically, we first investigated the optimal 
amount of factors to retain using a number of standard  indices68, and then tested whether the resulting factor 
structure was stable across the  inductions85. Factor analysis was performed with the “fa” function (in the “Psych” 
package)86, while the stability of the factor structure was performed with the “measurementInvariance” func-
tion (in the “semTools” package)85. Finally, we extracted participants’ scores on each of the obtained factors, and 
investigated whether these differed between the inductions, using multiple regression models. We tested two 
models on each factor score. “Model 1” addresses our main hypotheses of interest, thus predicting participants’ 
factor scores on the basis of the induction (three levels: Fear, Anger and Control), participants’ SVO category 
(two levels: prosocial and proself), and their interaction. “Model 2” aimed to assess robustness of the results by 
additionally controlling for a number of potential confound variables, including gender—which has elsewhere 
been shown to have a potential impact on decisions to cooperate or  punish71,87—as well as the (standardized) 
measure of subjects’ risk attitudes as measured by the lottery task described above. We report the results of Model 
1 in the results section and the results of Model 2 in the Supplementary Material. For all models, we report the 
results of the omnibus tests (as assessed by type III Anova) and further qualify these by means of contrasts, 
of which we report 95% confidence intervals p-values (as computed in the “lsmeans”  package88). P-values are 
Bonferroni corrected, unless otherwise noted. All analyses were carried out in  R89. Stimuli were prepared and 
administered in Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.).
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